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RICE AND CHEESE, ANYONE?  THE 
FIGHT OVER TRIPS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS CONTINUES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 legal concept that did not receive much attention,1 geo-
graphical indication (GI) protection within the context of 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS or the 
TRIPS Agreement) grasped media attention during the months 
leading up to the WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Conference2 which 
began in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003.3  The reason:  the 
European Union (EU) intended to seek at the Cancun meeting 
extension of the higher protection currently afforded only to 
wines and spirits under Article 23 of TRIPS4 to other agricul-
tural products,5 among them cheeses such as Roquefort, Gor-
  
 1. See Norma Dawson, Locating Geographical Indications – Perspectives 
from English Law, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 590, 590 (2000) (describing a “lack of 
general interest” in the issue within the legal profession). 
 2. For examples of media attention to the fight over GIs between the 
United States and the EU, see James Cox, What’s in a Name? USA TODAY, 
Sept. 9, 2003, at 1B; Edward Fennell, Champagne War, TIMES (London), Sept. 
2, 2003, at 9; Thomas Fuller, California Chablis? No Such Thing, Europeans 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2003, at C3; Scott Miller, Europe Says “That Cheese 
Is No Cheddar!” WALL S.J., Feb. 13, 2003, at B1; Amity Shlaes, An Unpalat-
able Attitude towards Food, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2002, at 19. 
 3. See WTO, The Fifth Ministerial Conference, at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). 
 4. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND, art. 23, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs (last visited Apr. 11, 2005) [hereinafter 
TRIPS].  Part II, Section 3 of TRIPS refers to Geographical Indications. 
 5. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communications from Bulgaria, Cuba, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and their Member 
States, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Pakistan, Romania, the Slovakia Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzer-
land, Thailand and Turkey, The Extension of the Additional Protection for 
Geographical Indications to Products Other than Wines and Spirits, 
IP/C/W/353 (June 24, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_ 
search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Proposal for Extension].  Al-
though proponents of the extension included developing countries such as 
 
A 
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gonzola, Parmigiano Reggiano and Feta, and meats like Morta-
della Bologna and Prosciutto di Parma.6  Simply put, the Euro-
peans believe that these names “belong to small producers in 
specific regions of Europe, where those delicacies originated and 
are still made to traditional specifications,”7 and they would like 
those names returned.8   
The issue remained on the table after the collapse of the Can-
cun Conference.9  Compared to negotiations over geographical 
indications that led to the TRIPS Agreement, however, the cur-
rent debate has a new dimension.  A few developing countries, 
led by India, have raised the issue in the context of the North-
South divide,10 which during the original TRIPS negotiations 
concerned other intellectual property right provisions but not 
geographical indications.11  In seeking heightened protection for 
their agricultural products such as basmati rice, jasmine rice 
  
India, Western media coverage appeared to have mostly focused on the con-
flicts between the EU and the United States.  
 6. See Cox, supra note 2 (listing forty-one food items for which the EU 
intended to seek additional protection under TRIPS).   
 7. Id. 
 8. See id.  
 9. The EU and eleven other member states made a recent effort pushing 
the extension of Article 23.  See WTO General Council Trade Negotiations 
Committee, Doha Work Programme – The Extension of the Additional Protec-
tion for Geographical Indications to Products Other than Wines and Spirits, 
Communication from Bulgaria, the European Communities, Guinea, India, 
Kenya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Moldova, Romania, Switzerland, Thailand 
and Turkey, WT/GC/W/540/Rev.1 (Dec. 10, 2004), available at http:// 
docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Extension 
Work Program].  See also India Joins 10-nation Bloc for GI-Extension, FIN. 
EXPRESS, Jan. 5, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 140493 [hereinafter India 
Joins Bloc] (reporting on India’s position and efforts on the extension of Arti-
cle 23). 
 10. In the WTO context, North-South refers to debates or disputes between 
developed and developing countries, while North-North refers to debates or 
disputes between developed countries.  See Doris Estelle Long, “Democratiz-
ing” Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 223 n.16 (2002).   
 11. See Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the 
TRIPS Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 31 (1996) (“In contrast to the other 
topics of the Intellectual Property package, this battle was not the typical line-
up between the first and the third world, but between the United States and 
the EC.”). 
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and Darjeeling tea,12 these developing countries hope to also 
utilize TRIPS to protect their rich biodiversity resources from 
exploitation by developed countries.13 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, WTO members agree to protect 
geographical indications, indications that identify the geo-
graphical origin of a good where “a given quality, reputation or 
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.”14  TRIPS generally prohibits the use of 
geographical indications which mislead the public,15 but affords 
protection of indications for wines and spirits even where the 
public is not misled.16  The EU and some twenty other countries 
now demand this higher level of protection for all products, not 
just wines and spirits.17   
The main targets of the push for enhanced protection of geo-
graphical indications include the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia and Argentina—the so-called “new world countries.”18  
Concerned that the EU position would “create gridlock and con-
fusion in U.S. supermarket aisles and force American compa-
nies to spend hundreds of millions repackaging and rebranding 
their products,”19 the United States has led a campaign to op-
pose the EU efforts as protectionist and creating trade barri-
ers.20    
  
 12. See G Ganapathy Subramaniam, Slim Chances of Special Status for 
Basmati, ECON. TIMES (India), Sept. 14, 2003. 
 13. See Muria Kruger, Note, Harmonizing TRIPs and the CBD: A Proposal 
from India, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 169, 176–77 (2001) (stating that India 
proposes extension of TRIPS GI protection as a way to protect its unique bio-
logical resources from exploitation by developed countries). 
 14. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 22.1. 
 15. Id. art. 22.2. 
 16. Id. art. 23.   
 17. See Proposal for Extension, supra note 5. 
 18. See Fuller, supra note 2. 
 19. Cox, supra note 2. 
 20. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Implications of Article 23 Extension, 
Communication From Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, 
Chinese Taipei and the United States, IP/C/W/386 (Nov. 8, 2002), available  
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter 
Implications of Extension].  See also Seven WTO Nations Oppose Added Pro-
tection for Geographical Indications for New Items, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
No. 32, at 1386 (Aug. 8, 2002).  
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The WTO dispute panel’s recent reports on two linked dis-
putes involving the EU regime of protecting geographical indi-
cations marked the latest major development in this area.21  In 
two separate but similar cases, the United States and Australia 
had challenged the EU geographical indications system for fail-
ing to protect non-EU geographical indications, such as “Flor-
ida” for oranges and “Idaho” for potatoes.22  The two members 
charged that the EU system was discriminatory against non-
EU countries23 because it required third countries outside the 
EU to have a system that is equivalent and reciprocal to the EU 
system in order to apply for protection for its geographical indi-
cations.24  The dispute panel ruled that the EU system’s 
“equivalence and reciprocity conditions” violated the TRIPS na-
tional treatment provision with respect to the availability of 
protection for geographical indications in the EU, and in so far 
as the EU system required extensive government involvement 
in the application and objection procedures.25  But the EU inter-
prets the ruling as having otherwise validated the EU system,26 
and all three parties declared victory.  The impact of the WTO 
panel rulings remains to be seen; however, before their public 
  
 21. See Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks 
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Com-
plaint by the United States, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/panelreport_174_290_e.htm [hereinaf-
ter Panel Report]; Panel Report, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint by Australia, 
WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 2005), available at id.    
 22. For the U.S. case, see Press Release, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, United States Wins “Food Name” Case in WTO against EU 
(Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/ 
March/United_States_Wins_Food_Name_Case_in_WTO_Against_EU.html 
[hereinafter USTR Press Release].  For the Australian case, see Press Release, 
Minister for Trade of Australia, Vaile Welcomes Win in Geographical Indica-
tions Dispute (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/ 
2005/mvt019_05.html [hereinafter Australian Press Release].        
 23. See USTR Press Release, supra note 22; Australian Press Release, 
supra note 22. 
 24. See USTR Press Release, supra note 22. 
 25. See Panel Report, supra note 21, § 8.1B. 
 26. See Press Release, European Commission, WTO Panel upholds EU 
system of protection of “Geographical Indications” (Mar. 15, 2005), 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/298&forma
t=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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release on March 15, 2005,27 the rulings were already widely 
considered a setback for the EU in its pursuit of higher protec-
tion of geographical indications for all foodstuffs.28   
This Note argues that extending the protection of geographi-
cal indications beyond the current level would be an implausible 
distraction from implementing the geographical indications 
provisions of TRIPS; the proposed potential benefits would 
unlikely justify the EU’s protectionist approach or satisfy devel-
oping countries’ unique needs for protection from exploitation 
by developed countries.  Part II reviews the historical context of 
multilateral protection for geographical indications prior to 
TRIPS.  Part III examines the TRIPS provisions regarding geo-
graphical indications and recent developments that may impli-
cate the negotiations.  Part IV analyzes the issue of Article 23 
extension both as a North-North battle between the EU and the 
United States and their respective legal systems, and in the 
context of a North-South debate between developed and devel-
oping countries, and the plausibility of enhanced protection in 
addressing unique situations facing developing countries such 
as India.  In conclusion, Part V proposes that, as a trade forum, 
the current TRIPS provisions should be maintained as the 
minimum standard for the protection of geographical indica-
tions to achieve a reasonable compromise of diverging interests 
among WTO members. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS BEFORE TRIPS 
Geographical indications were the prevailing type of designa-
tion for products in antiquity.29  Some countries, especially 
France, began very early to protect geographic names or indica-
tions of origin associated with a certain product or a certain 
quality standard of a product.30  To these countries, protecting 
  
 27. The WTO initially issued confidential rulings to the parties in Novem-
ber 2004.  The rulings were then made public on March 15, 2005.  See U.S. 
Claims Victory in WTO Geographic Indications Case, FOOD & DRINK WEEKLY, 
Dec. 27, 2004, at 1.  
 28. See Edward Alden et al., WTO Rules Against Europe on Food Names, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 19, 2004, at 7. 
 29. Conrad, supra note 11, at 11. 
 30. Id. 
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geographical indications can be as much about economics as it 
is about national culture and politics.31 
Three international multilateral agreements addressed the 
protection of geographical indications prior to the TRIPS 
Agreement of 1994.32  The Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property of 1883 (Paris Convention)33 prohibits false 
indications through border measures.34  The Madrid Agreement 
for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source 
on Goods of 1891 (Madrid Agreement)35 mainly provides for bor-
der measures and prevents dilution of certain geographical in-
dications into generic terms.36  Finally, the Lisbon Agreement 
for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their Interna-
tional Registration of 1958 (Lisbon Agreement)37 provides for an 
international registration system of geographical indications 
and strict protection.38  
As the following discussions will illustrate, two difficulties 
characterize the state of geographical indications protection 
through multilateral agreements before TRIPS.  The agreement 
either leaves the scope of protection undefined (and effective 
protection thus depending upon the good will of each member 
  
 31. See id. at 13.  See also Fuller, supra note 2 (stating the protection of 
geographical indications “is a highly emotional and politically sensitive ques-
tion, even within Europe”). 
 32. See Roland Knaak, The Protection of Geographical Indications Accord-
ing to the TRIPS Agreement, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS – THE AGREEMENT ON 
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 117, 119 (Frie-
drich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).  See also Conrad, supra 
note 11, at 22–23. 
 33. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/paris/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 34. Conrad, supra note 11, at 23. 
 35. Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications 
of Source on Goods, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available at http:// 
www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/madrid/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Ma-
drid Agreement]. 
 36. Conrad, supra note 11, at 23. 
 37. Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their 
International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205, available at 
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/registration/lisbon/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) 
[hereinafter Lisbon Agreement]. 
 38. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 23. 
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country), or requires a standard of uniformity to ensure effec-
tive protection but at the cost of low membership.39   
A. The Paris Convention 
The Paris Convention addressed for the first time the issue of 
international protection of geographical indications,40 but that 
protection is very limited.41  Article 1(2) specifically includes as 
part of the industrial property protected by the Convention two 
types of geographical indications, indications of source and ap-
pellation of origin,42  but defines neither.43  Under Article 2 of the 
Convention, the two types of geographical indication also bene-
fit from national treatment.44  However, such national treat-
ment only affords protection to geographical indications at the 
same level that the law of the member country grants to its do-
mestic geographical indications.45  Therefore, the fact that geo-
graphical indications enjoy the same national treatment as 
other industrial property rights under the Paris Convention is 
of little value to a foreign member country if the protecting 
country does not have laws protecting geographical indications, 
or if the domestic protection is weak.46 
Although Article 10 of the Paris Convention solely concerns 
geographical indications and provides for border measures 
against the importation of goods bearing false representations 
of origin,47 the Agreement does not define what constitutes a 
false representation.48  Moreover, Article 10 applies only if such 
measures are already available under the law of the member 
country.49  Thus, Article 10 essentially provides for little more 
than the national treatment already provided by Article 2.50 
  
 39. See id. at 28. 
 40. See id. at 22.   
 41. See id. at 22–24; Knaak, supra note 32, at 119 (noting that the Paris 
Convention provides only “rudimentary protection for geographical indica-
tions”). 
 42. See Paris Convention, supra note 33, art. 1(2). 
 43. Dawson, supra note 1, at 591 n.4. 
 44. See Paris Convention, supra note 33, art. 2.  
 45. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 119–20. 
 46. See id. at 120. 
 47. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 24.   
 48. Id. 
 49. According to Knaak,  
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Article 10bis(3) was added to the Paris Convention in 1958.51  
It prohibits indications of the goods if they are “liable to mislead 
the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the 
characteristics, the suitability of their purpose, or the quantity 
of the goods.”52  This would seem to suggest that if the mention-
ing of “Champagne” on a bottle of American-made sparkling 
wine misleads the public to think that the wine originated in 
France and possesses characteristics of French Champagne, 
Article 10bis(3) would apply.53 
Notably, however, Article 10bis(3) is not applicable to repre-
sentations of geographic origin.54  The legislative history of Arti-
cle 10bis(3) shows that the words “the origin” were struck from 
the proposed draft at the veto of the United States.55  The 
United States insisted that including the reference to geo-
graphical origin would cause too many problems in U.S. law.56  
As a result, the Paris Convention prohibits only the importation 
of goods containing false geographical indications, but not the 
ones that are merely misleading.57  As of January 3, 2005, the 
  
[T]he evaluation of a direct or indirect use of a false indication of the 
source of goods depends solely on the understanding among the gen-
eral public and the legal interpretation in the country in which pro-
tection is provided.  It is these that determine whether a geographical 
indication is a protected indication of source or an unrestricted ge-
neric name or a fantasy designation which may also be used for prod-
ucts from a different geographical origin without amounting to a false 
indication of source. 
Knaak, supra note 32, at 120. 
 50. Conrad, supra note 11, at 24. 
 51. Jose Manuel Cortes Martin, TRIPS Agreement: Towards a Better Pro-
tection for Geographical Indications?, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 117, 123 (2004). 
 52. Paris Convention, supra note 33, art. 10bis. 
 53. See Louis C. Lenzen, Bacchus in the Hinterlands: A Study of Denomi-
nations of Origin in French and American Wine-Labeling Laws, 58 
TRADEMARK REP. 145, 184 (1968). 
 54. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 24–25. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. at 25. 
 57. Id.  An example of a geographical indication that is not false, but none-
theless possibly misleading is “California Chablis.”  Id. at 25 n.73.  In the 
Champagne example, winemakers in the Champagne District of France would 
claim that the Americans’ appropriation of the word “Champagne” constitutes 
a false indication of source under Article 10, and that it misleads the public as 
to the wine’s characteristics (instead of its origin).  See Lenzen, supra note 53, 
at 184–85. 
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Paris Convention has 169 members, including the United 
States 58 
B. The Madrid Agreement 
The Madrid Agreement exceeded the level of protection given 
to geographical indications by the Paris Convention.59  Mislead-
ing geographical indications are now prohibited under Article 
1(1).60  Article 3bis, as adopted by the Revision Conference of 
London in 1934, prohibits the use of false representations not 
only on the product itself but also in advertising or other forms 
of public announcements.61  As in the case of the Paris Conven-
tion, however, the protection of geographical indications under 
the Madrid Agreement also depends on the law of the country 
providing protection.62  The only exception is the heightened 
protection for wines under Article 4,63 which prohibits member 
countries from treating geographical indications of wines as 
generic terms.64  Article 4 is thus considered the most significant 
development of geographical indications in the Madrid Agree-
ment.65   
Two factors attribute to the limitations of the Madrid Agree-
ment.  Divergent views exist regarding the construction of the 
text (for example, the use of terms such as “type” or “style”),66 
thus restricting the Agreement’s practical application.67   Many 
  
 58. A list of the Paris Convention members can be found on the website of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), at http://www.wipo. 
int/treaties/en/documents/word/d-paris.doc (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). 
 59. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 120.  
 60. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 35, art. 1(1) (including in its scope 
of protection “all goods bearing a false or deceptive indication”).   
 61. Conrad, supra note 11, at 25. 
 62. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 35, art. 4.  See also Knaak, supra 
note 32, at 120–21 (noting that under Article 4 of the Madrid Agreement pro-
vides that “the courts of the country of protection decide whether a geographi-
cal indication constitutes an indication of source protected by the Agreement 
or whether it is a generic name”). 
 63. Knaak, supra note 32, at 121. 
 64. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 25. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id.   
 67. See id.  See also Knaak, supra note 32, at 121 (“[T]he use of geographi-
cal indications of source with explanatory additions [is not] regulated by the 
Madrid Agreement, [and] can only be covered by the prohibition on deception.  
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nations have not acceded to the Agreement,68 which is another 
reason why the impact of the Madrid Agreement has been 
minimal.69  The United States is not a signatory to the Madrid 
Agreement. 
C. The Lisbon Agreement 
The Lisbon Agreement was another attempt to foster higher 
protection of geographical indications than the Paris Conven-
tion.70  The Lisbon Agreement did not limit the protection of 
geographical indications to border measures, as was the focus 
for both the Paris Convention and the Madrid Agreement.71  In-
stead, the Lisbon Agreement adopted a registration system 
comparable to that of trademarks.72  Article 2(1) defines “appel-
lations of origin” by borrowing the French interpretation of “ap-
pellations d’origine,”73 and prohibits the use of indications where 
the quality and characteristics are “due exclusively or essen-
tially to the geographical environment, including natural and 
human factors.”74  Protection is only available, however, if these 
appellations of origin are “recognized and protected as such in 
the country of origin.”75  Under the Lisbon Agreement, these 
appellations of origin are registered at the International Bureau 
of Intellectual Property, an agency of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO).76  Once registered, no geo-
graphical indication can become generic in any other country as 
long as it is protected in its country of origin.77 
Under the Lisbon Agreement, the broad protection of appella-
tions of origin applies to “any usurpation or imitation without 
  
The exploitation of another’s reputation without deception is not covered by 
the provisions of the Madrid Agreement.”). 
 68. As of October 15, 2004, only thirty-four States are members of the Ma-
drid Agreement.  A list of those members can be found on the WIPO website, 
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/word/f-mdrd-o.doc (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2005).   
 69. Conrad, supra note 11, at 25. 
 70. See id. at 23. 
 71. Id. at 26. 
 72. See id.  
 73. See id. 
 74. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 37, art. 2(1). 
 75. Id. art. 1(2).  
 76. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 26. 
 77. See id. 
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the pre-condition of a risk of confusion.”78  The comprehensive 
protection under Article 3 also prevents trademark registration 
in the member states.79 
The fundamental problem with the Lisbon Agreement is its 
low membership:80 as of February 16, 2005, only twenty-three 
countries have signed it.81  Many countries who traditionally 
have been interested in the extensive protection of geographical 
indication have failed to join the Lisbon Agreement82 because of 
its excessively narrow approach.83  The Agreement’s provisions, 
designed to suit the requirements of geographical indications 
for wines, are found to be unsuitable for most other geographi-
cal indications.84  Because the Lisbon Agreement presupposes a 
national system of protection such as the French system of ap-
pellations d’origine,85 other existing forms of protection (such as 
protection through the law of unfair competition against the 
misleading use of geographical indications) do not meet the Lis-
bon Agreement’s requirement for protection in the country of 
origin.86 
Another important factor preventing countries from signing 
up is the issue of genericness.  The Lisbon Agreement does not 
make exceptions for terms that have already become generic in 
some member countries.87  That was the main reason why the 
United States has not signed the Lisbon Agreement.88  The issue 
of genericness has also hindered the negotiations process of the 
  
 78. Knaak, supra note 32, at 121.  
 79. See id. 
 80. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 26. 
 81. A list of the members can be found on the WIPO website, at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/word/j-lisbon.doc (last visited Apr. 
12, 2005).   
 82. Conrad, supra note 11, at 26 n.76 (“Countries which have traditionally 
protected geographical indications such as Switzerland, Spain, or Germany 
have not become members.”).  
 83. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 122. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id.   
 86. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 26. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 26 n.77 (noting that on the issue of genericness, “the [Lisbon] 
Agreement is directly contrary to the United States trademark law and the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) regulations and was the 
main reason why the United States has not become a member”) (internal cita-
tion omitted). 
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TRIPS Agreement,89 which used the relatively high standard of 
geographical indications protection of the Lisbon Agreement as 
one of its drafting models.90   
III.  TRIPS AND LATER DEVELOPMENTS 
The TRIPS Agreement, which became effective on January 1, 
1995,91 brought two important changes to the protection of geo-
graphical indications.  For the first time, promises to protect 
geographical indications are backed with enforcement provi-
sions.92  Compared with previous international treaties on the 
protection of geographical indications, TRIPS also had at the 
time the greatest number of signatories,93 with all WTO mem-
bers signatories to the Agreement.94  TRIPS’ unprecedented 
membership helped establish its status as a breakthrough in 
the field of international protection of geographical indications.95 
A. General Substantive Standards 
TRIPS defines the term “geographical indications” as “indica-
tions which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
Member or a region or locality in that territory, where a given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essen-
tially attributable to its geographical origin.”96  Article 22 pro-
vides a standard level of protection and covers all products 
  
 89. See id. at 26. 
 90. Id. at 23. 
 91. WTO, TRIPS: Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (providing a 
broad overview of the Agreement and its aspects).  
 92. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that the “TRIPS provisions on 
dispute settlement may be the most important change in the protection of 
geographical indications”).  
 93. Id. at 31. 
 94. Stacy D. Goldberg, Comment, Who Will Raise the White Flag?  The 
Battle between the United States and the European Union over the Protection 
of Geographical Indications, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 116 (2001). 
 95. See id.  The WTO has 148 members as of February 16, 2005.  For a list 
of the WTO members, see WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization: 
Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). 
 96. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 22.1.  
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qualified for protection as geographical indications under 
TRIPS.97   
Article 22.1 limits protection to products for which a relation-
ship between their qualities or characteristics and their origin 
can be demonstrated.98  TRIPS, however, does not offer any test 
for what is considered “essentially attributable.”99  Much like 
the protection of all other intellectual property rights under 
TRIPS, protection under Article 22.1 is subject to the laws of 
the country where protection is being sought, and each member 
nation would independently decide which indications fall under 
the protection of TRIPS .100   
This lack of standards may be critical in the implementation 
of the TRIPS geographical indications provisions, as the deter-
mination and evaluation of the connection between a good and 
its geographical origin is necessary for protection under Article 
22.101  As this Note will discuss, the fact that this protection is 
subject to the principle of the country of protection is also one of 
the reasons some countries, led by the EU, want to extend the 
Article 23 protection for wines and spirits to all geographical 
indications.102 
Which goods are protected under Article 22 also remains an 
open debate.  Some scholars argue that because the final 
  
 97. WTO, TRIPS: Geographical Indications: Background and the Current  
Situation, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm 
(last updated Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter TRIPS Current Situation]. 
 98. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 32. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 128 (stating that protection for geo-
graphical indications under TRIPS “is basically subject to the principles of 
territoriality and the rules of the country of protection”).  
 101. See id. (“The determination and evaluation of this necessary connection 
between good and its geographical origin will no doubt be one of the most dif-
ficult tasks in the application and implementation of the TRIPS provisions on 
geographical indications.”).  Conrad argues that the lack of standard may be 
even more critical for the implementation of TRIPS compared to the Lisbon 
Agreement, because the Lisbon Agreement limits protection only to those 
geographical indications that are protected “as such” in their countries of ori-
gin and registered at the International Bureau of Intellectual Property, 
whereas the TRIPS Agreement contains no such limitations.  See Conrad, 
supra note 11, at 32. 
 102. See Proposal for Extension, supra note 5, para. 13 (arguing that protec-
tion of geographical indications under Article 22 is subject to inconsistent 
interpretation by each member country). 
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Agreement does not contain the words “including natural and 
human factors,” which are part of the Lisbon definition and 
were proposed in the EU draft, this omission may be construed 
to exclude human factors.103  Under this view, the scope of pro-
tection under Article 22 may be narrowed “almost exclusively to 
agricultural products; manufacturers are not protected even if 
their product is ‘essentially’ linked to the cultural heritage of 
the region.”104  Others, however, argue that the plain language 
of Article 22.1 makes clear that all goods, including industrial 
goods, are protected, because the TRIPS definition does not ex-
pressly contain product-specific limits to the scope of protec-
tion.105  
Protection of geographical indications under Article 22 is 
through general prohibition on deceptive use, similar to the 
Madrid Agreement, and additionally against unfair competition 
by incorporating Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.106  Article 
22.2(a) imposes two requirements in determining a violation of 
geographical indication:  a representation on a good suggesting 
its origin, and this suggestion being false or misleading.107  Al-
though Article 22.2(a) does not explicitly prohibit the use of 
geographical indications with explanatory additions, such use 
may be covered if it is found to create the risk of deception or 
  
 103. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 11, at 33 (arguing that omission of the 
words “including natural and human factors” may significantly narrow the 
scope of TRIPS geographical indications, but noting that excluding tradition 
and craftsmanship from geographical indications protection appears to be 
contrary to the general concept of TRIPS). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Knaak, supra note 32, at 128 (comparing the TRIPS geo-
graphical indications definition with the relevant EU Regulation, Council 
Regulation No. 2081/92, which contains language limiting its application to 
certain agricultural products and foodstuffs).  EU Council Regulation No. 
2081/92 establishes protection of geographical indications for agricultural 
products that are not viticultural products or alcoholic drinks and for food-
stuffs.   See Council Regulation 2081/92/EEC of 14 July 1992 on the Protection 
of Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Prod-
ucts and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J (L 208) 1.  
 106. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 130.  Article 22.2 of TRIPS requires 
member countries to protect geographical indications (a) against any use of 
designations or presentation of goods that “misleads the public as to the geo-
graphical origin of the good,” and (b) against any use that constitutes an act of 
unfair competition within the meaning of Article. 10bis of the Paris Conven-
tion (1967).”  TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 22.2. 
 107. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 34.    
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public confusion.108  Additionally, Article 22.4 prohibits the use 
of a statement that is “literally true as to the territory, region or 
locality in which the goods originate,” but nonetheless “falsely 
represents to the public that the goods originate in another ter-
ritory.”109  This is the issue of the so-called homonymous geo-
graphical indications.110  An example would be that “a couturier 
from Paris, Texas, may not use the mark PARIS on his clothes – 
notwithstanding geographical truth – if consumers would be-
lieve that those clothes came from Paris, France.”111 
TRIPS is also the first international agreement to provide 
additional protection of geographical indications in the context 
of laws concerning trademark registration.112  Article 22.3 pro-
hibits granting trademark registration which contains or con-
sists of a geographical indication when the goods do not origi-
nate in the territory indicated, if the use of the indication in the 
trademark misleads the public.113  Member countries are re-
quired to “ex officio if its legislation so permits or at the request 
of an interested party, refuse or invalidate” such trademark 
registration.114   
B. Additional Protection for Wines and Spirits 
Article 23 of TRIPS provides a higher level of protection for 
wines and spirits.  Article 23.1 states that members “shall pre-
vent use of a geographical indication identifying wines [and 
spirits] not originating in the place indicated by the geographi-
cal indication in question … even where the true origin of the 
goods is indicated….”115  Further, this prohibition applies to 
where “the geographical indication is used in translation or ac-
companied by expressions such as ‘kind’, ‘type’, ‘style’, ‘imita-
tion’ or the like.”116  Usages such as “California Chablis,” 
“American Champagne,” and a sparkling wine “type Cham-
  
 108. Knaak, supra note 32, at 130. 
 109. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 22.4. 
 110. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 131. 
 111. GRAEME DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 19 (2001). 
 112. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 131.   
 113. See TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 22.3. 
 114. Id. 
 115. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 23.1. 
 116. Id. 
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pagne” would thus fail this standard even if they are truthful 
statements.117  
Article 23 is undoubtedly a higher standard of protection be-
cause geographical indications relating to wines and spirits are 
protected even when there is no danger that the public may be 
misled.118  Therefore, it is of no consequence that, in the United 
States, Champagne and Chablis are considered semi-generic 
terms.119  This “absolute prohibition” standard120 thus precludes 
the defense available under Article 22 that the presentation of 
the goods is not misleading or deceptive.121 
Although Article 23 seeks to implement an effective standard 
of protection against using names of wines and spirits as ge-
neric terms,122 TRIPS does not attempt to reverse or disturb the 
status quo, and exceptions to Article 23 protection are pro-
vided.123  Article 24.6 exempts a member from the obligation to 
provide protection if a geographical designation has become a 
generic term in the member country.124  It further provides an 
  
 117. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 39–40. 
 118. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 132. 
 119. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (2005) (legislating the labeling and advertising of 
wines and providing examples of generic, semi-generic and non-generic 
names).  The BATF’s classification of geographic indications for wines may be 
inconsistent with TRIPS.  See Peter M. Brody, Protection of Geographical 
Indications in the Wake of TRIPS: Existing United States Laws and the Ad-
ministration’s Proposed Legislation, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 520, 530 (1994) (ar-
guing that the BATF list may be inconsistent with TRIPS, but the BATF may 
claim that the “semi-generic” category falls under one or more of TRIPS Arti-
cle 24 exceptions). 
 120. Knaak, supra note 32, at 132. 
 121. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 39.   
 122. See id. at 39–40.   
 123. See id. at 43 (noting that Article 24.4, which addresses the issue of 
parallel use of geographical names for wines and spirits “is tantamount to an 
acknowledgement that TRIPS does not and cannot reverse past development 
in the field”). 
 124. Article 24.6 of TRIPS states:  
 
Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions 
in respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with re-
spect to goods or services for which the relevant indication is identical 
with the term customary in common language as the common name 
for such goods or services in the territory of that Member.  Nothing in 
this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in respect 
of a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to 
products of the vine for which the relevant indication is identical with 
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exception specifically for wines.  Insofar as wines are usually 
named after grape varieties, use of the grape name is allowed if 
the grape existed in the member’s territory at the time of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement.125  In addition, Article 24.4 
permits parallel use of geographical indications for wines and 
spirits if a name has been in continuous use for at least ten 
years before the TRIPS Agreement or has been in use “in good 
faith” before TRIPS.126  The case of Budweiser beer is perhaps 
the most famous example for “continuous use.”127  The region of 
Budweis, Bohemia has been brewing beer since the thirteenth 
century and named its beer accordingly.128  Budweiser, however, 
has also been the name of a well-known American beer since 
the nineteenth century.129  The TRIPS Agreement does not at-
tempt to decide this dispute; rather, it allows parallel use of the 
term and leaves it to the parties to fight the name war.130  Fi-
nally, Article 23 is also subject to the general exceptions of Arti-
cle 24, discussed below. 
The provision on wines and spirits was one of the “most 
closely fought-over provisions in the whole GATT.”131  The 
United States delegation charged that the EU was attempting 
to reinstitute terms that have lost meaning as geographic indi-
cations and become generic terms in the United States, terms 
  
the customary name of a grape variety existing in the territory of 
that Member as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.  
TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 24.6. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 43.  Conrad used the case of “Bocksbeu-
tel” as an example of use in good faith.  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
held in the Bocksbeutel case that Germany could not limit the importation of 
an Italian wine on the grounds that the wine bottle resembles the distinctive 
“Bocksbeutel” bottles, although the “Bocksbeutel” bottle was protected as an 
indication of origin in Germany.  The ECJ found that the Italian wine produc-
ers did not choose the bottle design for the resemblance; rather, they had been 
using it for over a hundred years.  See id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.   
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  See also Robert Anderson, Pressure Mounts in Battle of the Bud-
weiser Brands: End of Century-Old Dispute between Czech and US Breweries 
May Be Near, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 2, 2003, at 24 (noting that “with the 
two breweries fighting about 30 legal cases in 25 countries, even their senior 
executives cannot say exactly how many”).  
 131. Conrad, supra note 11, at 38.   
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such as “Champagne” and “Chablis.”132  The current debate on 
the extension of the Article 23 protection largely echoes this 
theme. 
C. General Exceptions 
In addition to the exceptions already noted, Article 24 of the 
TRIPS Agreement also contains other important exceptions.  
Article 24.5 provides two exceptions in the context of trademark 
registration.133  A trademark registered in good faith that is 
identical to a geographical indication will remain valid under 
Article 24.5 if it was registered (a) before the TRIPS Agreement, 
or (b) before the geographical indication is protected in its coun-
try of origin.134  However, questions remain as to the meaning of 
“in good faith.”135  Section (b) poses the scenario of particular 
concern to developing countries, in which if a country does not 
yet have a system of protecting geographical indications, it may 
find its names registered as trademarks in other countries.136  
The fight between India and an American company over the 
registration of “basmati” as both a patent and trademark in the 
United States illustrates this potential problem.  The basmati 
rice case is discussed further in Section IV of this Note.  
Finally, Article 24.9 provides another noteworthy exception, 
essentially one from the national treatment concept.137  A mem-
ber is not obligated to protect geographical indications that are 
not protected in their country of origin.138   
  
 132. Id. at 40. 
 133. See Knaak, supra note 32, at 136. 
 134. See id.  According to Knaak, combination trademarks including the 
name “Chablis” could remain valid if registered in good faith.  See id. at 137.  
See also Conrad, supra note 11, at 42 (discussing whether “Chablis With A 
Twist” can be considered to be “in good faith” within the meaning of Article 
24.5).   
 135. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 42 (arguing that although “in good faith” 
may be interpreted as “not knowing the rights of other parties,” as the term is 
commonly understood, construing the term to mean “without deceptive or 
misleading intent” here may be more adequate considering the purpose of 
Article 24.5). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 44.     
 138. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 24.9 (“There shall be no obligation under this 
Agreement to protect geographical indications which are not or cease to be 
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D. Recent Developments 
The Doha Round mandates further debates on two separate 
issues concerning the protection of geographical indications: 
creating a multilateral register for wines and spirits, discussed 
briefly below; and extending the higher (Article 23) level of pro-
tection beyond wines and spirits,139 discussed in Section IV. 
Two sets of proposals on a multilateral registration system 
are currently on the table.140  The United States, along with six-
teen other member states, proposes “a voluntary system where 
notified geographical indications would be registered in a data-
base.”141  The EU and another sixteen member states propose a 
registration system that establishes a “presumption” that the 
geographical indication is protected in all other countries.142  
Under this proposal, once a term is registered, no country could 
refuse protection unless it has challenged the term within 
eighteen months.143  Since any registration system would involve 
the various legal systems of each member country, countries are 
deeply concerned about the kind of legal effect such a system 
may have and the administrative and financial costs for indi-
vidual members.144  The Doha Declaration sets a deadline for an 
agreement for the Cancun Ministerial Conference,145 which, 
however, collapsed on September 14, 2003.146 
IV.  EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 23 PROTECTION 
TRIPS members also remain deeply divided over the issue of 
extending Article 23 protection to products other than wines 
and spirits.147  The EU along with twenty other countries advo-
  
protected in their country of origin, or which have fallen into disuse in that 
country.”).   
 139. TRIPS Current Situation, supra note 97.   
 140. See id. 
 141. Id.   
 142. Id.   
 143. Id.  
 144. See id.  For a discussion of the differences in legal systems between the 
United States and the EU countries, see Conrad, supra note 11, at 17–22. 
 145. TRIPS Current Situation, supra note 97.  
 146. See Guy De Jonquieres & Frances Williams, Investment Row Causes 
WTO Talks to Collapse, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 2003, at 1 (reporting on 
the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial Conference). 
 147. TRIPS Current Situation, supra note 97.   
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cates the extension.148  These countries contend that extending 
Article 23 protection will protect all geographical indications 
equally;149 by eliminating the elements of deceptiveness and 
public confusion currently required under Article 22, the exten-
sion will avoid inconsistency in implementation due to each 
member country’s individual determination under their own 
laws as well as costly, individualized legal battles.150  Propo-
nents for extension of Article 23 also claim that other countries 
are “usurping” their geographical indications.151  Notably, the 
EU position has received a boost from some developing coun-
tries, led by India, who see Article 23 as a means to protect 
their biodiversity resources, a need unique to developing coun-
tries.152   
Opponents of extension, such as the United States, argue that 
existing Article 22 protection is already adequate.153  These 
countries frame the debate as one between the “new world” and 
the “old world” countries;154 considering the “new world coun-
tries” stand to gain very little by agreeing to provide additional 
protection, extension of Article 23 would be expensive and hard 
to justify.155  They reject the “usurpation” accusation, emphasiz-
ing that, in many cases, immigrants made the products well 
known by continuing to make and consume them in their new 
homes, 156 and it is these very products whose names the Euro-
pean countries are now trying to take back.157 
  
 148. See Proposal for Extension, supra note 5, paras. 4, 12.  
 149. See id. para. 4.  
 150. See id. para. 13. 
 151. See TRIPS Current Situation, supra note 97.  See also Extension Work 
Program, supra note 9, para. 10.   
 152. See India Calls for Harmonising TRIPS with CBD, HINDU, Sept. 3, 
1999, available at 1999 WLNR 4582558 [hereinafter India Calls for Harmoni-
zation] (delineating developing countries’ need for special protection to ensure 
conservation of biological resources and equitable share of benefits from their 
use, and India’s proposed provisions including extension of Article 23 to meet 
such need). 
 153. Implications of Extension, supra note 20, paras. 6–9. 
 154. See TRIPS Current Situation, supra note 97.   
 155. See Implications of Extension, supra note 20, paras. 4, 13–26. 
 156. See TRIPS Current Situation, supra note 97 (stating that countries 
opposing the Article 23 extension reject the “usurping” accusation “particu-
larly when migrants have taken the methods of making the products and the 
names with them to their new homes”). 
 157. See Implications of Extension, supra note 20, para. 7. 
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The current debate over the extension of Article 23 is an in-
teresting hybrid of the North-North face-off and North-South 
divide.158  On one hand, the ongoing fight led by the EU and the 
United States echoes in many ways the fiercely-fought battles 
between the two major trade partners during the negotiations 
leading up to the TRIPS Agreement.159  On the other hand, 
while geographical indications started out largely as a North-
North issue, developing countries have now joined the debate as 
the biodiversity-rich South seeks protection from exploitation 
by the industrialized North.160  This Section examines the pro-
posed extension of Article 23 in both contexts.     
A. The Battle between Europe and the United States 
The current fight between the United States and the EU may 
be viewed as an extension of the old battle leading up to the 
TRIPS Agreement.  The EU has continued to push the agenda it 
had to compromise in 1994 in order to reach an agreement161 
and the United States, contending that extending Article 23 
would force upon countries with few geographical indications 
obligations disproportionate to the possible benefits,162 is reluc-
  
 158. See Long, supra note 10, at 222–23 (arguing that although the disputes 
over geographic indications demonstrate the on-going and increasingly heated 
North-North debates, the North-South debates and their underlying power 
imbalance remain the most problematic in intellectual property rights). 
 159. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 31 (noting the atypical line-up in the 
battles fought between the United States and the EU during TRIPS negotia-
tions on geographical indications), 38 (commenting on the debate between the 
U.S. and the EU over the protection of wines and spirits, “the most closely 
fought-over provisions in the whole GATT”). 
 160. See India Calls for Harmonization, supra note 152.  See also Shalini 
Bhutani & Ashish Kothari, Rio’s Decade: Reassessing the 1992 Earth Summit: 
Reassessing the 1992 Biodiversity Convention: The Biodiversity Rights of De-
veloping Nations: A Perspective from India, 32 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 587, 
603–05 (2002) (urging developing countries to explore protection of their bio-
resources under geographical indications of TRIPS). 
 161. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 45–46 (stating that the battle between 
the European Community and the United States led to a compromise that is 
the current TRIPS protection of geographical indications). 
 162. See Implications of Extension, supra note 20, paras. 3–4.  According to 
the United States, 
One Member may only have a few geographical indications for do-
mestic products in which it is interested, but would be obliged to pro-
vide the means to protect hundreds or thousands of GIs from Mem-
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tant to make any further concessions.  In light of the recent 
WTO panel rulings mandating the EU to bring its geographical 
indications regulations into compliance with the TRIPS,163 the 
United States now expects to see U.S. products such as the 
Idaho potato and Florida orange protected as geographical indi-
cations under the EU system in the near future.164  There is 
therefore even less reason for the United States (and other 
countries opposing Article 23 extension) to work with the EU 
mandate or the EU model of geographical indications protec-
tion. 
The difference between the U.S. and EU legal systems is also 
of serious concern to the Americans resisting further demands 
from the Europeans for additional protection of geographical 
indications.165  The United States was able to accept the higher 
level of protection of Article 23 for wines and spirits because its 
existing system allows it to carry out that obligation through 
the regulatory power of the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and 
Firearms (BATF) over the use of geographical indications for 
alcohols.166  Extending the Article 23 level of protection to all 
geographical indications would therefore be very problematic 
for the U.S. legal system167 which, unlike the EU, does not have 
a registration mechanism for geographical indications and pri-
  
bers with formal systems for such indications…. This imbalance is 
exacerbated by the fact that, under the current EC regulations, the 
EC does not appear to provide protection for non-EC geographical in-
dications … except on the basis of bilateral agreements, or if the EC 
has determined that a country has a system for geographical indica-
tions that is equivalent to the detailed system of the EC. 
Id. para. 4. 
 163. See Panel Report, supra note 21, §§ 8.4–8.5. 
 164. The United States interprets the WTO panel ruling to mean that U.S. 
products such as the Idaho potato and Florida orange would now be entitled to 
protection as geographical indications in the EU.  See USTR Press Release, 
supra note 22.   
 165. See Implications of Extension, supra note 20, paras. 16, 20 (emphasiz-
ing that providing additional protection under Art. 23 would disturb the exist-
ing U.S. model of protection under the U.S. legal system).  For a discussion of 
the differences in legal systems between the United States and the EU coun-
tries, see Conrad, supra note 11, at 17–22. 
 166. See Peter N. Fowler & Alice T. Zalik, Globalization’s Impact on Inter-
national Trade and Intellectual Property Law: A U.S. Government Perspective 
Concerning the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty: Past, Present and Near Future, 17 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 401, 407 (2003).   
 167. See id. 
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marily provides for protections through trademark laws, and 
which recognizes such protection as a matter of private right.168  
Requiring countries such as the United States to change their 
legal systems to accommodate the protection of geographical 
indications belonging to other countries may also offend the 
principle of territoriality.169  
Moreover, the EU demand for absolute protection of its geo-
graphical indications is difficult to justify with possible eco-
nomic and consumer benefits.  It has been argued that the po-
tential economic benefits of geographical indications protection 
are elusive at best.170  Meanwhile, geographical indications pro-
tect, almost indefinitely,171 what has been done in the past 
rather than encourage innovation, an important value underly-
ing other forms of intellectual property rights such as patent 
and trademark.172  The element of consumer benefit is also lack-
ing.  Much of the EU extension proposal concerns food names 
already well recognized by consumers.173  Additional protection 
of these geographical indications at the Article 23 level would, 
therefore, serve more protectionist purposes while offering little 
  
 168. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 20 (stating that the concept of the Anglo-
American certification mark is a regime of private, not public law); Implica-
tions of Extension, supra note 20, paras. 7–8 (asserting that the United States 
treats geographical indications as private rights). 
 169. See Jim Chen, A Sober Second Look at Appellations of Origin: How the 
United States Will Crash France’s Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 29, 53 (1996) (arguing that U.S. refusal to protect French geographical 
indications that “mean nothing to the American consumer” would be consis-
tent with the international legal principle of territoriality). 
 170. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 12 (stating that “the economic impor-
tance of geographical indications is very hard to determine”). 
 171. See TRIPS: What Are Intellectual Property Rights?, http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) 
(stating that the protection of geographical indications “may last indefi-
nitely”). 
 172. See, e.g., David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool 
to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253, 259 (2000) (ar-
guing that geographical indications are intended “not to reward innovation, 
but rather to reward members of an established group or community for ad-
hering to traditional practices”).   
 173. See Tobias Buck, Brussels Heads for Controversy over Famous Food 
Names, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at 7 (noting that the EU list of food names 
it intends to take back from producers outside Europe includes famous names 
such as Champagne, Bordeaux, Parma ham, Roquefort and Feta). 
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in terms of protecting consumers or enhancing consumer choice 
in the marketplace.   
Although the EU proposal for extending Article 23 protection 
does not explicitly suggest establishing a registration system 
similar to the one in the EU, countries such as the United 
States believe it is foreseeable that the EU demands would in-
evitably lead to such a system in order to facilitate the proposed 
higher protection.174  However, the EU model of geographical 
protection may make for a poor export when faced with a dras-
tically different American legal system and consumer culture.175  
It would therefore be in both parties’ interests for the European 
countries to adapt to the legal and cultural realities in the 
United States and take advantage of the protections currently 
available through the U.S. legal system.176   
Moreover, the EU would also be well advised to shift its focus 
from fighting legal battles to educating consumers through 
more aggressive marketing campaigns,177 because in the long 
run the fight over geographical indications is likely non-legal.178  
  
 174. See Implications of Extension, supra note 20, para. 19.  
 175. In his article comparing the French system of appellations of controlled 
origin (AOC) to the U.S. legal system, Chen comments on the lack of geo-
graphical indication protection in American jurisprudence:  
The very idea of an AOC is alien to American law and American cul-
ture….  In a legal system whose constitution forbids the granting of 
perpetual patents and copyrights, the indestructible appellation of 
origin has little chance of finding a warm reception.  American intel-
lectual property law is designed to maximize dissemination of knowl-
edge through expansion of the public domain and minimized grants of 
proprietary protection.  The United States has long favored a positive 
law theory of intellectual property over a natural law theory, empha-
sizing the “limited” nature of “monopoly privileges” as a necessary 
evil over the putatively natural birthright of the inventor to prevent 
others from reaping where she has sown. 
Chen, supra note 169, at 58. 
 176. See id. at 58–63.  See also Implications of Extension, supra note 20, in 
which the United States asserts that geographical indications such as Stilton 
for cheese, Parma for ham, Roquefort for cheese, and Swiss for chocolate al-
ready receive Article 22 level protection because the owners of the geographi-
cal indications have taken steps to prevent unauthorized uses in the United 
States. 
 177. See Chen, supra note 169, at 63–64. 
 178. See id. at 53 (commenting that the decisive factors in a fight over geo-
graphical indications will be commercial, cultural and linguistic, instead of 
legal). 
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A wine connoisseur hardly needs an international treaty to tell 
him that Chablis from a certain region southeast of Paris will 
guarantee a certain satisfaction, while to an ordinary consumer 
without such knowledge the particular geographical indication 
would probably matter very little.179  Increasing the recognition 
of geographical indications through marketing campaigns 
would also likely be a feasible approach because, compared to 
developing countries, the European countries are more likely to 
be able to afford using its resources for consumer education in 
the marketplace. 
B. The Stakes for Developing Countries 
Demand for extension of the Article 23 protection from devel-
oping countries such as India, Pakistan and Thailand takes the 
debate out of the North-North standoff between the United 
States and the European countries.  These developing countries 
seek to utilize TRIPS provisions on geographical indications to 
protect their unique agricultural products such as basmati rice 
and jasmine rice.  In addition, they hope to rely on geographical 
indications to protect their rich biodiversity resources and pre-
vent traditions and indigenous communities from being ex-
ploited by the developed world.180  This invokes the North-South 
dichotomy that characterizes much of the debate on other intel-
lectual property issues covered by the TRIPS.181 
Since the beginning of the TRIPS Agreement, developing 
countries have criticized it as benefiting developed countries at 
the expense of developing countries.182  Commentators predicted 
before TRIPS took place that stronger protection of intellectual 
property rights would further disadvantage developing coun-
tries because they would lose access to affordable medicines, 
educational materials, and agricultural supplies.183  Some claim 
  
 179. See id. at 57–58. 
 180. See Bhutani and Kothari, supra note 160, at 604–05.  
 181. See Conrad, supra note 11, at 31 (observing that the typical line-up in 
other TRIPS topics involved battles between the first and the third world). 
 182. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Boundaries of the WTO: Afterword: The 
Question of Linkage, 96 A.J.I.L. 126, 127–28 (2002) (arguing that TRIPS is “in 
the main a payment by the poor countries (which consume intellectual prop-
erty) to the rich countries (which produce it)”). 
 183. See Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round – Ne-
gotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT’L 
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that the TRIPS Agreement is “a continuation of over 500 years 
of colonialism of developing countries,” in that it drains wealth 
and resources from the Third World countries and transfers it 
back to developed counties under the protection of intellectual 
property laws.184   
Although the major battles on geographical indications were 
initially fought mainly between the United States and the EU,185 
the issue has now become part of the larger North-South debate 
over TRIPS provisions in general.  Developing countries charge 
that granting special protection for wines and liquors under 
Article 23 disproportionately favors the North because geo-
graphical indications concentrate in developed countries that 
stand to benefit most from these provisions.186  India, in particu-
lar, has been a proponent since the WTO’s Seattle Meeting for 
extending Article 23 to all agricultural products in order to ease 
the North-South divide.187   
This Section will first examine India’s involvement in the de-
bate of geographical indications protection, as illustrated by its 
efforts to protect its indigenous culture in the fights over the 
patents on the neem tree and basmati rice obtained by U.S. 
companies, and its advocacy for extending Article 23 protection 
to all geographical indications.  It will then analyze whether 
heightened geographical indications protection under TRIPS 
would be a fitting solution to India’s problems, which may be 
concerns also shared by other developing countries. 
1. Neem Tree 
At the time TRIPS was passed, India was still suffering the 
aftermaths of the “neem tree incident.”188  Referred to as “the 
village pharmacy,”189 the neem tree is native to India and tradi-
tionally used by the Indian people for many medicinal pur-
  
L. 1317, 1383–84 (1990) (arguing that farmers, students, and the sick in de-
veloping countries rely on cheap access to seeds, education and drugs). 
 184. Kruger, supra note 13, at 170–71. 
 185. Conrad, supra note 11, at 31. 
 186. Bhutani and Kothari, supra note 160, at 604. 
 187. Kruger, supra note 13, at 176 n.43. 
 188. Id. at 173. 
 189. Charles R. McManis, The Interface between International Intellectual 
Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 
WASH. U. L. Q. 255, 257 (1998). 
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poses.190  W.R. Grace, an agricultural chemical company based 
in Florida, developed the technology to extract the active ingre-
dient in the neem tree seed in a stable solution and patented 
the stabilization process and the stabilized form of the ingredi-
ent with the United States Patent Office (USPTO).191  W.R. 
Grace then obtained a European patent jointly with the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) on the manufactur-
ing process of the neem tree seed oil as a fungicide.192  These 
patents meant that India, despite its ownership of the neem 
tree and having used the medicinal plant for centuries, had no 
legal rights to develop the plant for medicinal or curative pur-
poses.193   
The W.R. Grace patents provoked vehement public outcry in 
India194 and led to India’s long journey to reclaim the neem 
tree.195  India was eventually successful in its legal challenge of 
the U.S. acquisition of its neem tree ingredient before the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO).  After six years of persistent cam-
paigning by India, the Opposition Division of the EPO com-
pletely revoked the patent granted to the USDA and W.R. 
Grace.196  The EPO also rejected W.R. Grace’s subsequent ap-
peal.197 
2. Basmati Rice  
India had a similar incident with its renowned basmati rice, a 
staple of its national diet and a major source of its export reve-
  
 190. For detailed description of the neem tree’s medicinal properties, see 
Vandana Shiva, The Neem Tree – a Case History of Biopiracy, at http://www. 
twnside.org.sg/title/pir-ch.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).   
 191. U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349 (issued June 23, 1992).  For detailed discus-
sions of W.R. Grace’s U.S. patent, see Shiva, supra note 190; McManis, supra 
note 189, at 258. 
 192. European Patent No. 436 257 B1 (issued Sept. 14, 1994).   
 193. See Frederick Nzwili, Multinationals Lose Exclusive Rights over Neem 
Tree, AFR. NEWS SERV., May 22, 2000. 
 194. See McManis, supra note 189, at 257–59 (describing the violent 
demonstrations in India provoked by the neem tree patents). 
 195. See Nzwili, supra note 193 (reporting on events surrounding the revo-
cation of W.R. Grace’s European patent). 
 196. See id. 
 197. See EU Upholds Ruling Revoking Neem Patent for US Co., BUS. LINE, 
Mar. 10, 2005. 
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nue.198  Traditionally, only long grain aromatic rice grown in 
certain regions of India and Pakistan can be called basmati.199  
In 1997, an American company, RiceTec Inc., obtained a patent 
from the USPTO to grow and call the aromatic rice grown out-
side India “basmati.”200  With the basmati patent rights, RiceTec 
would not only be able to call its aromatic rice basmati within 
the United States, but also label it as such for its exports.201  
This had serious ramifications for India.  Not only would the 
patent affect India’s basmati export to the United States, an 
important market for India,202 it could also cause India to lose 
its position in other crucial international markets such as the 
EU, United Kingdom, Middle East and West Asia.203   
Economic consequences aside, because basmati is considered 
a national heritage of India, people in India felt the patent was 
“like snatching away our history and culture.”204  Like the neem 
tree patents, the basmati patent provoked large demonstrations 
in India.205  The Indian government reacted strongly to the 
granting of the U.S. basmati patent, urging the USPTO to re-
examine the patent in order to protect India’s interests, particu-
larly those of India’s growers and exporters.206   
India also considered protecting its prized basmati rice under 
the TRIPS geographical indications provisions, and has since 
become a zealous advocate for extending the Article 23 protec-
  
 198. See UPI Farming Today, UPI, Feb. 16, 1998, LEXIS, Nexis Library, 
UPI File [hereinafter UPI Farming] (stating that India exports about half a 
million tons of basmati rice annually).   
 199. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND 
BIODIVERSITY, SEEDS AND PLANT VARIETIES 87 (1999). 
 200. U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (issued Sept. 2, 1997). 
 201. See Shantanu Guha Ray, The Stealing of Basmati, at http:// 
www.rediff.com/business/1998/mar/12rice.htm (Mar. 12, 1998). 
 202. See Kunal Bose, India to Fight U.S. Move on Basmati Rice, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Feb. 25, 1998, at 35 (noting that at the time of the basmati patent, 
India exported some forty-five thousand tons of basmati rice annually to the 
United States). 
 203. See Ray, supra note 201.  
 204. UPI Farming, supra note 198. 
 205. See Saritha Rai, India-U.S. Fight on Basmati Rice Is Mostly Settled, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2001, at C1 (noting demonstrations in India against the 
basmati patent). 
 206. See id. 
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tion to products other than wines and spirits.207  India asserts 
that because the unique quality of basmati rice is closely re-
lated to specific regions of India where the long grain rice is 
traditionally grown, basmati should be protected as a geo-
graphical indication under TRIPS just like Champagne and 
Scotch.208   
The bitter fight over the U.S. patent on basmati rice was 
largely settled when the USPTO eventually granted a narrower 
patent to RiceTec.209  Satisfied that the new patent, limited to 
just a few variations of the rice developed by RiceTec, would not 
harm India’s own export of traditional basmati rice, India de-
cided not to further dispute the patent.210  
3.  Implications of the Neem and Basmati Incidents 
Despite India’s successes in challenging the neem tree and 
basmati rice patents, some commentators warn that India’s vic-
tories are limited.211  In the case of basmati rice, the United 
States still regards “basmati” as a generic term and that may 
eventually diminish the value of India’s basmati rice on the in-
ternational market.212  Moreover, the neem tree and basmati 
rice incidents illustrate the larger problem facing developing 
countries rich in biodiversity.  Without adequate protection, 
resources including plant varieties and traditional knowledge of 
the bio-rich South are under threat of exploitation from the 
more economically and technologically developed North.213  
Countries like India worry that, short of an integrated ap-
proach, such case-by-case challenges would be too costly and 
  
 207. See India Joins Bloc, supra note 9 (stating that since the basmati pat-
ent incident, India has been keen on extending TRIPS protection of geo-
graphical indications to products like basmati rice and Darjeeling tea). 
 208. See Rai, supra note 205.   
 209. See id. (reporting on events surrounding the USPTO’s granting of a 
narrow basmati patent to RiceTec).     
 210. See id. 
 211. See M.D. Nair, Winning the War against Bio-Colonisation, HINDU, May 
17, 2000 (analyzing bio-colonization in the wake of India’s neem patent vic-
tory); D. Sampathkumar, Basmati: The Threat Still Lingers, BUS. LINE, Sept. 
2, 2001 (observing that the basmati patent outcome was received as both an 
“unalloyed victory” and a “resounding defeat” in India). 
 212. See Sampathkumar, supra note 211. 
 213. Other biopiracy problems India experienced include patents on tur-
meric, jamun, brinjal, and several hundred others.  See Nair, supra note 211. 
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ultimately ineffective to stop developed countries from continu-
ing to commit biopiracy.214 
India and a few other developing countries have turned to 
geographical indications in seeking an integrated approach to 
protect their natural wealth.  These countries demand extend-
ing the heightened protection under Article 23 to cover products 
other than wines and spirits to suit their needs.215  They argue 
that extending the Article 23 protection to all geographical indi-
cations could have prevented developed countries such as the 
United States from exploiting the traditions and resources be-
longing to developing countries like India, and would also alle-
viate developing countries of the burden of costly individual le-
gal battles with developed countries.216  In that scenario, extend-
ing the Article 23 protection to all geographical indications 
would do more than benefit European countries.  It would be an 
opportunity to achieve a better balance between the divergent 
interests in the area of intellectual property rights of developed 
and developing countries.  However, a closer look at India’s ex-
perience of the neem and basmati patents indicates that ex-
tending Article 23 protection may not be the answer to develop-
ing countries’ quest for balance of power and benefits under the 
TRIPS Agreement.    
First, India’s lack of adequate domestic protection under in-
tellectual property law was largely responsible for both the 
neem and the basmati incident.  W.R. Grace never applied for a 
patent in India because, at that time, India did not grant pat-
ents for agricultural products.217  It is also widely believed that 
RiceTec took out a U.S. patent on basmati only because of weak, 
non-existent Indian intellectual property laws and the govern-
ment’s philosophical attitude that natural products should not 
  
 214. See id. (analyzing dilemmas facing the South and advocating for an 
integrated approach to protection of bioresources). 
 215. See India Joins Bloc, supra note 9 (stating that by seeking extension of 
Article 23, India aims to ensure TRIPS as a framework that permits devel-
oped and developing countries alike to protect their geographical indications 
efficiently and effectively). 
 216. See Nair, supra note 211 (arguing that winning small battles at high 
costs will have little impact on the broader war against bio-colonization, and 
that an integrated strategy, including geographical indications protection 
under TRIPS, is the only solution). 
 217. Kruger, supra note 13, at 173–74. 
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be patented.218  In reaction to the neem tree and basmati rice 
patents, India has strengthened its legal regime to conform to 
international laws on intellectual property, and its local com-
munities have become more aware of and taken actions to pro-
tect their sovereign rights over traditional biological re-
sources.219  The challenge remains, however, that domestic legis-
lation may still fail to safeguard the biodiversity rights of the 
people because it is not keeping up with the pace at which in-
ternational trade agreements are being implemented.220   
Second, although developing countries’ attempts to formulate 
long-term strategies to prevent future biopiracy has led them to 
seek the protection of geographical indications, the TRIPS defi-
nition of geographic indication remains a barrier to their quest.  
It is debatable whether neem and basmati fall within the defi-
nition of geographical indications under TRIPS.   The terms are 
not geographical indications per se in that they do not suggest a 
strong connection between a product and a particular geo-
graphical region.221  In the case of basmati, its geographical ori-
gin is difficult to determine, because basmati rice is considered 
native to more than one region of India and Pakistan.222  In fact, 
India and Pakistan disagree on what qualifies as authentic 
basmati.223 
  
 218. See The Basmati Task for the New Government, at http://www. 
rediff.com/business/1998/mar/23rice.htm (Mar. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Basmati 
Task] (noting that as of March 1998, India had not “bothered with getting 
together a geographical appellation act which could have prevented RiceTec 
from using the name of basmati which it claims is a generic name and not a 
trademark”); Rai, supra note 205 (stating that before the RiceTec basmati 
patent, “India largely ignored any claim or legal protection for growers and 
marketers of basmati,” and therefore India’s international patent appeal ap-
peared weak).     
 219. See Bhutani and Kothari, supra note 160, at 605–11. 
 220. See id. at 612. 
 221. See DUTFIELD, supra note 199, at 88 (arguing that, unlike Darjeeling 
tea, basmati is not a geographical expression per se). 
 222. See id. at 87 (stating basmati rice is cultivated in areas of Northern 
India and Pakistan); Sampathkumar, supra note 211 (listing the regions in 
India where basmati is grown and arguing that qualifying basmati as a geo-
graphical indication “would be extending the concept … to a level far beyond 
anything attempted till now”). 
 223. See DUTFIELD, supra note 199, at 87.  India and Pakistan both seek to 
protect basmati as a geographical indication.  See Farm Council: Council Sets 
New Fixed Tariffs for Rice, EUR. REP., July 21, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
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Third, even if definition is not an issue, the neem tree and 
basmati rice would still be outside the protection mandated by 
the geographical indications provisions of TRIPS, because nei-
ther was afforded any kind of geographical indication protection 
within India.224  Under the Article 24.9 exception to national 
treatment, WTO members are not obligated to provide protec-
tion for geographical indications not recognized in their own 
country of origin.  Therefore, India would have had very weak 
cases for protecting the neem tree and basmati rice as TRIPS 
geographical indications, and even under the Article 23 abso-
lute protection standard, success would have been unlikely.225 
Fourth, even assuming that the TRIPS provisions for protect-
ing geographical indications apply, developing countries such as 
India have not demonstrated any unique need, compared with 
developed countries such as the EU members, for extending the 
heightened level of protection of Article 23 to all geographical 
indications.  Countries opposing the extension argue that there 
is no evidence suggesting that the current level of protection 
provided by Article 22 for general geographical indications is 
inadequate for either developed or developing countries.226  To 
the extent that the protection afforded to geographical indica-
tions under Article 22 is not absolute, the fact that India has 
been successful in challenging the neem tree and basmati rice 
  
7275569 (both “India and Pakistan will push for basmati to be recognised as a 
geographical indication at WTO level”). 
 224. See DUTFIELD, supra note 199, at 88 (stating that India would only 
have a case for protecting basmati rice as a geographical indication after ap-
propriate national legislation is in place first).   
 225. See id. (arguing that for India to have a strong case for protecting bas-
mati as a geographical indication, India first needs to have appropriate do-
mestic legislation in place).  But see Basmati Task, supra note 218 (stating 
that despite the lack of Indian domestic law protecting basmati rice as a geo-
graphical indication, India’s “geographically indicated rights” have long been 
protected in other nations such as the UK and Saudi Arabia). 
 226. Alejandro Jara, Ambassador of Chile to the WTO, and David Spencer, 
Ambassador of Australia to the WTO, recently argued that “[t]here is no evi-
dence to show the need for a higher level of protection, nor have authoritative 
empirical studies shown that there would be additional economic benefits for 
developing countries.”  Alejandro Jara & David Spencer, No Evidence Yet That 
Developing Countries Need More Protection for Geographical Names, FIN. 
TIMES (USA), July 7, 2004, at 12.  See also Kruger, supra note 13, at 198 (con-
sidering and rebutting developing countries’ arguments for extending Article 
23 to all products). 
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patents suggests that alternative means are available for devel-
oping countries to defend their intellectual property rights 
(even where the developing country’s domestic protection is 
weak).  That in turn makes for a weak argument for a leap in 
the direction of absolute protection of all geographical indica-
tions. 
Finally, a higher level of protection for geographical indica-
tions may not be the proper forum to address developing coun-
tries’ ultimate goal to achieve a balance in the North-South di-
chotomy and safeguard their traditional knowledge and biodi-
versity.  Although some scholars argue that geographical indi-
cation may be particularly well suited for the protection of tra-
ditional knowledge, because it recognizes communal, rather 
than individual ownership of rights,227 the current TRIPS geo-
graphical indications provisions cover only tangible goods, and 
may very well exclude services, knowledge or skills.228  More im-
portantly, the protection of biodiversity and traditional knowl-
edge encompass complex issues such as political, social and cul-
tural realities of different countries.229  While a full discussion 
on biodiversity and traditional knowledge is beyond the scope of 
this Note, TRIPS as a trade forum may not necessarily be the 
best venue for resolving these issues.       
V. CONCLUSION 
The TRIPS agreement provides a platform for the interna-
tional protection of geographical indications at an unprece-
dented level.230  To truly realize the TRIPS multilateral protec-
tion of geographical indications, WTO member countries need to 
engage in further negotiations in order to implement existing 
provisions, as well as addressing particular concerns of various 
members.  It should be stressed, however, that TRIPS recog-
nizes and protects intellectual property rights within the 
framework of international trade.  Therefore, member countries 
  
 227. See, e.g., Downes, supra note 172, at 271–72. 
 228. Conrad, supra note 11, at 33–34 (discussing that the TRIPS definition 
of geographical indication appears to exclude tradition, craftsmanship and 
services). 
 229. See Downes, supra note 172, at 266–67 (arguing biodiversity and tradi-
tional knowledge involves complex ethical and socioeconomic issues). 
 230. Conrad, supra note 11, at 45. 
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without significant interest in geographical indications are 
unlikely to agree to increase the current level of protection 
without obtaining meaningful concessions from countries de-
manding additional protections in return.  
While the WTO should be sensitive to the unique concerns of 
developing countries, extending Article 23 to protect all geo-
graphical indications may not necessarily be the cure for the 
North-South gap in the area of intellectual property rights.  
Lack of domestic protection for geographical indications often 
may bar developing countries from claiming protection under 
the relevant TRIPS provisions altogether.  Moreover, protecting 
the biodiversity and traditional knowledge of developing coun-
tries involves complex political, social, and economic undertak-
ings that may be best dealt with through venues other than in-
ternational trade. 
The WTO is at a crossroads.  While the debate over geo-
graphical indication may not “weather the high seas and stormy 
conditions of global trade,”231 the issue nonetheless significantly 
divides member countries as the WTO struggles to move for-
ward.  Rather than pushing the outer limits of geographical in-
dications and creating new gridlocks, member countries would 
be better served by preserving TRIPS’ groundbreaking multi-
lateral framework and working with TRIPS’ current minimum 
standard of protection for geographical indications.  To that 
end, the desire of some member countries for additional protec-
tion should be addressed through bilateral agreements which 
may be unfeasible on a multilateral level, but which could sup-






 231. Chen, supra note 169, at 58. 
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